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A B S T R A C T
During the rapid rise in COVID-19 illnesses and deaths globally, and notwithstanding recommended precautions,
questions are voiced about routes of transmission for this pandemic disease. Inhaling small airborne droplets is
probable as a third route of infection, in addition to more widely recognized transmission via larger respiratory
droplets and direct contact with infected people or contaminated surfaces. While uncertainties remain regarding the
relative contributions of the different transmission pathways, we argue that existing evidence is sufficiently strong
to warrant engineering controls targeting airborne transmission as part of an overall strategy to limit infection risk
indoors. Appropriate building engineering controls include sufficient and effective ventilation, possibly enhanced by
particle filtration and air disinfection, avoiding air recirculation and avoiding overcrowding. Often, such measures
can be easily implemented and without much cost, but if only they are recognised as significant in contributing to
infection control goals. We believe that the use of engineering controls in public buildings, including hospitals,
shops, offices, schools, kindergartens, libraries, restaurants, cruise ships, elevators, conference rooms or public
transport, in parallel with effective application of other controls (including isolation and quarantine, social dis-
tancing and hand hygiene), would be an additional important measure globally to reduce the likelihood of trans-
mission and thereby protect healthcare workers, patients and the general public.
1. Recognising the potential for the airborne transmission of
SARS-CoV-2
The significance of viral transmission via small airborne micro-
droplets (also commonly referred to as ‘aerosols’) has been intensely
discussed in the context of the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 (severe acute
respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2/coronavirus disease 2019) pan-
demic (Lewis, 2020; Morawska and Cao, 2020). This is one of three
commonly accepted modes of viral transmission, the other two being
via larger respiratory droplets (which fall close to where they are ex-
pired), and direct contact with contaminated surfaces (fomites). Espe-
cially with the ongoing global shortage of personal protective equip-
ment (mainly surgical masks and N95/FFP2/FFP3 respirators) (WHO,
2020c), additional methods to reduce the risk of SARS-CoV-2 trans-
mission indoors need to be considered. The need is acute in particular in
hospitals and other healthcare facilities managing COVID-19 patients.
While evidence for airborne transmission of COVID-19 is currently
incomplete, several hospital-based studies have performed air-sampling
for SARS-COV-2, including one published paper (Ong et al. 2020), one
early-release paper (Guo et al., 2020) and 5 papers still in pre-print at
the time of writing (Chia et al., 2020; Ding et al., 2020; Jiang et al.,
2019; Liu et al., 2020; Santarpia et al., 2020). Four of these studies
found several positive samples for SARS-CoV-2 genome (RNA) in air
using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing (Chia et al., 2020; Jiang
et al., 2019; Liu et al., 2020; Santarpia et al., 2020), two found very
small numbers of positive samples (Ding et al., 2020), and only one
(Ong et al., 2020) found no positive air samples. This evidence at least
demonstrates a potential risk for airborne transmission of SARS-CoV-2.
In addition, amongst these studies, three also reported some quan-
titative viral RNA data. The Singaporean study found positive air
samples in 2 of the 3 patient infection isolation rooms, with samples in
the 1–4 µm and>4 µm size ranges containing a range of viral loads
(1.8–3.4 viral RNA copies per L of air) (Chia et al., 2020). The study
from Nebraska, USA found that 63% of the air samples were positive
with a mean viral load of 2.9 copies/L, including in patient rooms and
the hallway air (Santarpia et al., 2020). In one case, they sampled close
to the patient (mean: 4.1 copies/L) and at> 1.8 m (mean: 2.5 copies/
L), suggesting some dilution with distance. The highest viral loads were
found in personal samplers worn by the sampling team when in the
presence of a patient receiving oxygen via nasal cannula (mean: 19 and
48 copies/L), indicating that this treatment may promote the spread of
airborne virus. A study in Wuhan, China (Liu et al., 2020) provides
quantitative data for their small number of positive air samples, with
0.02 RNA copies/L in a toilet area and 0.02–0.04 copies/L in a room
used to remove PPE. More than half the viral RNA in these samples was
associated with aerosols< 2.5 µm. This study also measured deposition
through passive aerosol sampling, reporting deposition rates of 31 and
113 RNA copies/m2 per h at samplers located approximately 2 m and
3 m from the patients, respectively (Liu et al., 2020).
Whilst this evidence may be deemed to be incomplete at present,
more will arise as the COVID-19 pandemic continues. In contrast, the
end-stage pathway to infection of the droplet and contact transmission
routes has always been assumed to be via self-inoculation into mucous
membranes (of the eyes, nose and mouth). Surprisingly, no direct
confirmatory evidence of this phenomenon has been reported, e.g.
where there have been: (i) follow-up of fomite or droplet-contaminated
fingers of a host, self-inoculated to the mucous membranes to cause
infection, through the related disease incubation period, to the devel-
opment of disease, and (ii) followed by diagnostic sampling, detection,
sequencing and phylogenetic analysis of that pathogen genome to then
match the sample pathogen sequence back to that in the original fomite
or droplet. It is scientifically incongruous that the level of evidence
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required to demonstrate airborne transmission is so much higher than
for these other transmission modes (Morawska et al., 2020).
The infectious agents of several other diseases (tuberculosis,
measles, chickenpox) are recognised to be transmissible via the air-
borne route, either by the short-range (face-to-face, conversational ex-
posure) or by longer-range aerosols (Department of Health, 2015;
Tellier et al., 2019). Measles and varicella zoster (the virus causing
chickenpox) can also be efficiently transmitted through direct contact
during their acute phase of infection (e.g. by kissing). During a close
contact situation, all transmission routes can be potentially responsible
for infection.
For other respiratory viruses, including SARS-CoV, MERS-CoV
(Middle-East Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus), respiratory syncytial
virus (RSV – a common cause of bronchiolitis in infants) and influenza,
both short-range and longer-range airborne transmission are possible,
but the predominance of longer range transmission route in various
exposure scenarios is difficult to quantify (Booth et al., 2013; Kim et al.,
2016; Kulkarni et al., 2016; Li et al., 2007; Tellier et al., 2019), and may
at times be opportunistic (Roy and Milton, 2004).
A recent mechanistic modelling study showed that short-range air-
borne transmission dominates exposure during close contact (Chen
et al., 2020). Other studies investigating the transport of human-expired
microdroplets and airflow patterns between people also provide sub-
stantive support for this transmission route (Ai et al., 2019; Li et al.,
2007; Liu et al., 2017). Therefore, in light of this body of evidence for
these other respiratory viruses; we believe that SARS-CoV-2 should not
be treated any differently – with at least the potential for airborne
transmission indoors.
Yet despite this, international health organisations, like the WHO
(World Health Organization) (WHO, 2020b), continue to place in-
sufficient emphasis on protection from small, virus laden, airborne
droplets. Other organisations that deal with building environmental
control systems, such as REHVA (the Federation of European Heating,
Ventilation and Air Conditioning Associations) and ASHRAE (the
American Society of Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning En-
gineers), have acknowledged the potential airborne hazard indoors and
recommended ventilation control measures accordingly (ASHRAE,
2020a; REHVA, 2020).
Infection control specialists also often inquire about the relative
contribution of airborne transmission compared to the other transmis-
sion modes (‘contact’ and ‘droplet’). Multiple studies provide strong
evidence for indoor airborne transmission of viruses, particularly in
crowded, poorly ventilated environments (Coleman et al., 2018;
Distasio et al., 1990; Knibbs et al., 2012; Li et al., 2005; Moser et al.,
1979; Nishiura et al., 2020). However, it is generally difficult to
quantitatively compare and conclude which transmission route is the
most significant in a given situation. Infection may occur via all routes
to different degrees depending on the specific exposure circumstances.
Effective infection control necessitates protection against all potentially
important exposure pathways.
Here, in the face of such uncertainty, we argue that the benefits of
an effective ventilation system, possibly enhanced by particle filtration
and air disinfection, for contributing to an overall reduction in the in-
door airborne infection risk, are obvious (Eames et al., 2009).
2. Engineering controls to reduce the potential airborne
transmission of SARS-CoV-2
To maximise protection of the population against the airborne
spread of SARS-CoV-2 and any other airborne virus-containing small
microdroplets, several recommendations are necessary as presented
below. These focus on indoor environments, because this is where most
transmission occurs (Nishiura et al., 2020). Further, the measures
mostly apply to public buildings. In residential houses and apartments,
normal practices (e.g. segregating infected individuals, opening win-
dows and doors, and using portable air-cleaning devices when prac-
tical) to ensure healthy indoor air, should stay in place at any moment.
Ventilation airborne protection measures which already exist can be
easily enhanced at a relatively low cost to reduce the number of in-
fections and consequently to save lives. The options discussed below
should always be implemented in combination with other existing
measures (like hand-washing and use of PPE) to reduce infection via
other important routes of transmission, as none of them can be com-
pletely excluded in any exposure event. The remainder of this article
will only cover recommendations for ‘engineering level’ controls, as
described in the traditional infection control hierarchy (Fig. 1) to re-
duce the environmental risks for airborne transmission.
2.1. Ventilation should be recognised as a means to reduce airborne
transmission
Ventilation is the process of providing outdoor air to a space or
building by natural or mechanical means (ISO, 2017). It controls how
quickly room air is removed and replaced over a period of time. In some
cases, it is necessary to remove pollution from outdoor air before
bringing it into a building, by using adequate filtration systems. Ven-
tilation plays a critical role in removing exhaled virus-laden air, thus
lowering the overall concentration and therefore any subsequent dose
inhaled by the occupants.
Appropriate distribution of ventilation (e.g. placement of supply
and exhaust vents) ensures that adequate dilution is achieved where
and when needed, avoiding the build-up of viral contamination
(Melikov, 2011, 2016; Thatiparti et al., 2016, 2017). The central
guiding principle is to replace contaminated air with clean air, but
sometimes local barriers to this process may occur, e.g. where partitions
are used or curtains drawn for privacy or medical procedures. If these
barriers are in use, secondary or auxiliary measures may be needed to
achieve requisite ventilation effectiveness.
Good ventilation practices are already in place in many hospital
settings, as part of everyday and emergency measures to protect against
droplet and contact transmission (Phiri, 2014). Good ventilation also
protects the occupants against airborne transmission. The capacity to
increase ventilation rates when needed (such as during the COVID-19
pandemic) may differ, and may be somewhat limited by their original
design specifications and implementation.
Note that many hospitals are naturally ventilated in ward areas,
including in some rooms used for critical care. However, if the airflow
passage is obstructed (e.g. by closing windows and doors), airborne
pathogen concentration can sharply rise leading to an increased risk of
Fig. 1. Traditional infection control pyramid adapted from the US Centers for Disease Control (CDC, 2015).
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airborne transmission and infection (Gilkeson et al., 2013). Natural
ventilation concepts apply to healthcare facilities in both developed and
resource-limited countries in favourable climatic conditions. The de-
sign, operation and maintenance of naturally ventilated facilities is not
straightforward, and comprehensive guidance is available (WHO,
2009). For instance WHO in March, (WHO, 2020a) specifies that in a
COVID-19 infective ward at least 160 L/s/patient have to be provided if
natural ventilation is used.
We have recently seen the creation of very large emergency hospital
wards, within exhibition centres for example, which house hundreds or
even thousands of patients (MSN, 2020). Although these facilities will
have mechanical ventilation that is adequate for normal exhibition or
conference use, it is not clear if sufficient ventilation will be available
for patient management and infection control purposes when they are
adapted for such purposes, as during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The situation can be worse in public buildings and other shared
spaces, such as shops, offices, schools, kindergartens, libraries, restau-
rants, cruise ships, elevators, conference rooms or public transport,
where ventilation systems can range from purpose-designed mechanical
systems to simply relying on open doors and windows. In most of these
environments, ventilation rates are significantly lower than in hospitals
for various reasons, including limiting airflows for energy and cost
savings.
Hence, in such environments, with lower ventilation rates intended
primarily to control indoor air quality (which may also include some
hospital emergency, acute admissions, general ward and clinic areas)
(Booth et al., 2013; Jo et al., 2019; Kulkarni et al., 2016; Rule et al.,
2018; Sornboot et al., 2019), the likelihood of infected persons sharing
air with susceptible occupants is high, posing an infection risk con-
tributing to the spread of the infectious disease.
Various studies have been performed on the survival of airborne
pathogens (Brown et al., 2015; Kim et al., 2016; Kormuth et al., 2018;
Kulkarni et al., 2016; Marr et al., 2019; Pyankov et al., 2018; Tang
2009). The SARS-CoV-2 virus has been shown to be stable in airborne
particles with a half-life of more than one hour (van Doremalen et al.,
2020), so it can potentially be inhaled by susceptible individuals
causing infection and further spreading of the disease.
As ‘stay-at-home’ lockdown measures are gradually relaxed, much
of the population may return to spending increasing amounts of time in
inadequately ventilated workplaces, offices, schools and other public
buildings, where they may be exposed to a risk of acquiring viral in-
fections by inhalation.
2.2. Ventilation rates should be increased by system modifications.
In a mechanically ventilated building, ventilation air is typically
provided by a heating, ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) system.
Sometimes, ventilation air is provided by dedicated fans or outdoor air
units.
HVAC system control strategies can usually be modified to increase
ventilation to a certain extent in the occupied zones, with relatively
little additional cost, to reduce the risks of airborne transmission be-
tween occupants. However, this is not via a simple ‘flick of a switch’, as
HVAC systems are complex and usually designed for individual build-
ings within standard specific operating parameters. Many requirements
need to be considered apart from the ventilation rate, including control
of temperature, relative humidity, air flow distribution and direction.
Such systems can be specifically customised as needed by HVAC
engineers, e.g. to reduce the risks of airborne transmission. Indeed, the
ventilation guidance of ASHRAE (The American Society of Heating,
Refrigerating, and Air-conditioning Engineers), REHVA, SHASE (The
Society of Heating, Air-Conditioning and Sanitary Engineers of Japan)
have all just been updated to address the spread of COVID-19 (ASHRAE,
2020b; REHVA, 2020; SHASE, 2020). Another example is the mod-
ification of a hospital ward ventilation system to create a negative
pressure isolation ward (Miller et al., 2017).
If ventilation is provided using windows openings (aeration) or
other means (fixed openings, e.g., natural ventilation), an estimation of
the possible outdoor flow rate can be made using CEN Standard, EN
16798-7:2017 (CEN, 2017), or other available references as (AIVC,
1996; CIBSE, 2005). The outdoor air flow rate that is achieved is
strongly dependent on the specific local conditions (opening sizes, re-
lative positions, climatic and weather conditions, etc.) and should be
estimated case by case; it can easily range from 2 up to 50 ACH or more.
For naturally ventilated public buildings, particularly in cold cli-
mates, other challenges will arise, but these can also be addressed in
order to reduce the risk of airborne infection transmission. It may be
necessary to provide additional heating in some buildings to maintain
thermal comfort, particularly where the occupants are vulnerable.
2.3. Avoid air recirculation
The recirculation of air is a measure for saving energy, but care must
be taken, as it can transport airborne contaminants (including in-
fectious viruses) from one space and distribute them to other spaces
connected to the same system, potentially increasing the risk of air-
borne infection in areas that otherwise would not have been con-
taminated. This concern has been noted previously in regard to the
possible recirculation of biological agents during terrorist attacks that
have investigated the effectiveness of eliminating recirculation (e.g.
providing 100% outside air to spaces and exhausting all of it) as a
countermeasure following an indoor release of the agent (Persily et al.,
2007). A study modelling the risk of airborne influenza transmission in
passenger cars provided also a case against air recirculation in such
situations (Knibbs et al., 2012).
Particulate filters and disinfection equipment in recirculated air
streams can reduce this risk, but they need to be purposely designed to
control risk of airborne infection and need regular service to maintain
their effectiveness. Many systems are designed for filters that are in-
tended to remove larger particles that may affect the functioning of
equipment and that are not effective at removing small, sub micrometre
or micrometre size particles associated with adverse health effects.
Filter ratings by test methods, such as ASHRAE Standard 52.2
(ASHRAE, 2017) that give an indication of performance as a function of
particle size should be utilized in choosing appropriate filters.
Following the above considerations, during an epidemic, including
the current COVID-19 pandemic, air should not be recirculated as far as
practically possible, to avoid the dissemination of virus-laden particles
throughout the indoor environment For central air handling units at a
building level or serving multiple zones, recirculation should be avoided,
and the system operated on 100% outdoor air (OA) if possible. Disabling
recirculation can be achieved by closing the recirculation dampers and
opening outdoor air dampers. In systems where it is not possible, one
should try to maximize the OA-level and apply filtering or ultraviolet
germicidal irradiation to remove or deactivate potential viral con-
tamination from the recirculated air. In many health care settings, air
recirculation is, in most cases not allowed at all, though though re-
circulation is commonly used in non-hospital settings for improving en-
ergy efficiency. At a room (decentral) level, secondary air circulation
systems may be installed. One needs to assure that any of such systems
also provides ventilation with outdoor air (e.g., induction units). If this is
the case, such a system should not be switched off. Other systems, which
do not have this feature (e.g., split air-conditioning units) should if
possible be turned off, to avoid potential transfer of virus through air
flows between people. When such a system is needed for cooling then
additional ventilation with outdoor air should be secured by regular/
periodic ventilation through, e.g., window opening.
2.4. Air cleaning and disinfection devices may be beneficial
In environments where it is difficult to improve ventilation, the
addition of local air cleaning or disinfection devices, such as germicidal
Correspondence Environment International 142 (2020) 105832
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ultraviolet (GUV, or UVGI - ultraviolet germicidal irradiation) may offer
benefits. Under laboratory conditions GUV has been shown to be ef-
fective against a suite of microorganisms including coronaviruses
(Walker and Ko, 2007), vaccinia (McDevitt et al., 2007) and Myco-
bacteria (Xu et al., 2003), and even influenza (McDevitt et al., 2012;
McLean 1961). Several studies show that inactivation decreases with
increased humidity for both bacterial (Xu et al., 2005) and viral aero-
sols (McDevitt et al., 2012). Darnell et al. (2004) showed that SARS-
CoV-1 could be inactivated by UV-C, while Bedell et al. (2016) showed
a UV-C decontamination device could inactivate MERS-CoV at 1.22 m,
with almost a 6 log reduction in 5 min. There is no data yet for SARS-
CoV-2, but the data for other coronaviruses suggest it is highly likely
that it is susceptible to UV-C.
One application that grew dramatically during the multi-drug re-
sistant tuberculosis outbreaks of the 1980s (Young and Wormser,
1994), is the ‘upper-room’ system in which lamps are placed in the
upper part of the room, either on the walls or mounted on the ceiling,
directing the UV light into the upper zone with louvers and limiting UV
exposure in the occupied space (Xu et al., 2005, 2003). Upper-room
GUV is a good technology to consider in crowded, poorly ventilated
environments where aerosol transmission could occur and where the
ability to increase ventilation is limited. Long ago, McLean (1961)
presented data showing interruption of influenza transmission in a
hospital setting. It has been estimated that upper-room GUV may re-
duce infection risk by an amount equivalent to doubling the ventilation
rate (Noakes et al., 2015). Escombe et al. (2009) showed 77% reduction
in human to guinea pig transmission in a hospital setting, while
chamber based studies show the effectiveness of GUV against a number
of bacterial aerosols (Xu et al., 2005, 2003; Yang et al., 2012). These
concur with modelling studies (Gilkeson and Noakes, 2013; Noakes
et al., 2004; Sung and Kato, 2010; Yang et al., 2012) showing that the
effectiveness depends on the placement of the lamps relative to the
ventilation flow and that addition of a ceiling fan enhances GUV ef-
fectiveness (Xu et al., 2013; Zhu et al., 2014).
Factors that must be considered when evaluating the ability of
upper-room GUV to kill or inactivate airborne microorganisms include
the sensitivity of the microorganisms to GUV and the dose received by a
microorganism or population of microorganisms. GUV dose is the ul-
traviolet (UV) irradiance multiplied by the time of exposure and is
usually expressed as µW·s/cm2. Well-designed upper-room GUV may be
effective in killing or inactivating most airborne droplet nuclei con-
taining mycobacteria if designed to provide an average UV fluence rate
in the upper room in the range of 30 µW/cm2 to 50 µW/cm2, provided
the other elements stipulated in these guidelines are met. In addition,
the fixtures should be installed to provide as uniform a UVGI dis-
tribution in the upper room as possible (CDC/NIOSH 2009). A zonal
infection risk model (Noakes et al., 2015) suggests that an upper-room
GUV with a plane average irradiance of 0.2 W/m2 at the UV fixtures
could be comparable to increasing the ventilation rate from 3 to 6 ACH.
Portable consumer air cleaning devices may be beneficial in smaller
rooms, although it should be recognised that such devices must be
appropriately sized for the space (Miller-Leiden et al., 1996). There is
wide variation in performance of air cleaners depending on air cleaner
design and size of room in which it is used (Shaughnessy and Sextro,
2006). A useful metric for determining performance is the clean air
delivery rate, which is equivalent to the volumetric flow rate of
particle-free air produced by the air cleaner (Foarde, 1999). Kujundzic
et al. (2006) reported air cleaners were similarly effective against re-
moving both airborne bacterial and fungal spores from the air at clean
air delivery rates of between 26 and 980 m3/h corresponding to ef-
fective cleaning of between 5 and 189 m3 room volumes respectively.
GUV ‘in-duct’ application within air-conditioning systems and ven-
tilation ducts may also be a practical approach for disinfecting con-
taminated extracts or in cases where it is not possible to stop re-
circulation of ventilation flows (Kujundzic et al., 2007). However, these
systems are of little benefit against person-to-person transmission when
installed in the supply air of once-through systems that do not re-
circulate air within the space or building. The US Centers for Disease
Control has approved both upper-room and in-duct systems for use in
controlling tuberculosis transmission as an adjunct to HEPA filtration
(CDC/NIOSH, 2009).
2.5. Minimise the number of people within the same indoor environment in
an epidemic
This measure is self-explanatory in the context of the need to lower
the concentration of airborne virus-carrying particles, and reduce the
number of people who can be exposed at any time. There is no one
specific value for a number of people who could share the same space
during pandemics, and this measure should be considered in conjunc-
tion with the engineering measures discussed above, and particularly in
relation to the ventilation parameters of the space. Although the phy-
sical distance required to avoid transmission through direct contact
dictates the requirements for the floor area per person, the rate of
ventilation provided and the efficiency of ventilation are the para-
meters that control the concentration of virus-laden microdroplets in
the air exhaled by the occupants, and will guide decisions on safe oc-
cupancy numbers. In a school or a supermarket, for example, if the
number of infected students or shoppers is low, and the ventilation rate
is high, the risk of airborne transmission can be low. Similarly, during
an epidemic, reducing the number of people using public or private
transport at the same time, e.g. in subway train systems or busses, is part
of effective social distancing (Knibbs et al., 2012; Stopera and Stopera,
2020).
3. Conclusions
Until effective pharmacological treatments or vaccines are available
to reduce the effective reproductive number to less than 1.0 and stop
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, enhanced ventilation may be a key
element in limiting the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. These are the
key ventilation-associated recommendations (see Fig. 2):
(1) To remind and highlight to building managers and hospital ad-
ministrators and infection control teams that engineering controls
are effective to control and reduce the risks of airborne infection –
and SARS-CoV-2 has the potential and is likely to be causing some
infections by this route.
(2) To increase the existing ventilation rates (outdoor air change rate)
and enhance ventilation effectiveness - using existing systems.
(3) To eliminate any air-recirculation within the ventilation system so
as to just supply fresh (outdoor) air.
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(4) To supplement existing ventilation with portable air cleaners (with
mechanical filtration systems to capture the airborne micro-
droplets), where there are areas of known air stagnation (which are
not well-ventilated with the existing system), or isolate high patient
exhaled airborne viral loads (e.g. on COVID-19 cohort patient bays
or wards). Adequate replacement of the filters in the air cleaners
and their maintenance is crucial.
(5) To avoid over-crowding, e.g. pupils sitting at every other desk in
school classrooms, or customers at every other table in restaurants,
or every other seat in public transport, cinemas, etc.
If implemented correctly, these recommended building-related
measures will lower the overall environmental concentrations of air-
borne pathogens and thus will reduce the spread of infection by the
airborne route. Together with other guidance on minimising the risk of
contact and droplet transmission (through hand-washing, cleaning of
hand-touch sites, and the appropriate use of PPE), these ventilation-
related interventions will reduce the airborne infection rates not just for
SARS-CoV-2 in the current COVID-19 pandemic, but also for other
airborne infectious agents.
While much of the focus has been on case finding, isolation and
quarantine, social distancing and hand hygiene, we emphasise that a
parallel reduction in airborne transmission using such engineering
controls in hospitals and other public buildings will further protect
healthcare workers, patients and the general public.
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